of the critical habits of the modern historian," who can draw on resources that were inaccessible in earlier times, 6 and "see the case as it would have appeared to a seventeenth century lawyer." 7 So viewed, a respectable case can be made for Colonial reliance on Coke. Not that the validity of Coke's statement is essential to sustain the structure that the Founders went on to build. The animating force of an idea is not necessarily measurable by its verity. "We may deny, for example, the validity of belief in the supernatural, but we cannot deny its tremendous power." 8 Though one may doubt a divine revelation to Mohammed, Mohammedanism nevertheless swept the world. The importance of Coke for judicial review does not therefore depend on whether he correctly stated the then existing law, but rather on the fact that at the time of the Constitutional Convention, Colonial America believed he did, and proceeded to act on that belief. Nonetheless, it is my theme, a lawyer of the seventeenth or eighteenth century might justly understand Coke to have meant exactly what he said: that courts could declare void statutes which were against "reason," a word that had a special meaning for the time: first, because of reiterated acceptance of that opinion for upwards of one hundred years after it had been uttered, and second, because the words seemed to reflect the legal tradition of the preceding centuries. This is not the prevailing view, and I beg to be indulged in an attempt to rehabilitate Coke's statement as a source of what we term "judicial review."
In the years preceding 1787, there was little or no incentive to go behind Coke's statement, the more so because it was congenial to the Colonial forces that were mounting an attack on parliamentary claims of supremacy.' Blackstone, who first articulated the claim for the 45. 7Id. at 41. See also Thorne, Introduction to A DiscouRsE UPON THE ExPoSICION supremacy of Parliament in 1765,1° referred to Coke as an object of "great veneration and respect," a "man of infinite learning in his profession, [whose] writings are so highly esteemed, that they are generally cited without the author's name." "' Jefferson recorded that there never was "one of profounder learning in the orthodox doctrines of the British Constitution or what is called British rights" than Coke.' Coke's statement had been repeated (though without citation) by Chief Justice Hobart in 1614; 13 it had been approved by Chief Justice Holt; 14 and it had been taken up in the Abridgements.', Colonial lawyers may therefore be pardoned for not going behind Coke to his hoary citations, if they were indeed accessible.' 6 In the eyes of the Colonists, "reiterations of the dictum by Coke's successors on the bench, and by commentators, had given to it, by the middle of the eighteenth century, all of the character of established law." 7 Professor Crosskey stated that the effects of Coke's "ill-founded ideas . . . .were almost immediately wiped out, by 'the glorious Revolution' of 1688 .... ," 18 In the seventeenth century the issue was "between parliament and the king, and in this the courts and parliament were allies." 2 The "Glorious Revolution," to be sure, established the power of Parliament vis-A-vis the King; but Chief Justice Holt apparently concluded that it left Coke's view untouched, for shortly thereafter-in 1702-he stated that Coke's statement is "a very reasonable and true saying." 20 The fact that the Revolution secured 10 "The omnipotence of Parliament was not the orthodox theory of English law, if orthodox at all, even in Holt's time. It was first formally adopted . . . in Blackstone's Commentaries. . . . Down to the Revolution the common legal opinion was that statutes might be void as 'contrary to common right' . . . ." Pollock, A Plea for Historical Interpretation, 39 L.Q. REv. 163, 165 (1923) . Moreover, "for well over a century legislative activity in the colonies had been subject to the test of conformity with English law. Thus, the common law system had itself served as a standard of right, in a sense as a sort of constitution." Goebel 567.
judicial tenure during good behavior 21 might have persuaded the Colonists that it sought to strengthen rather than weaken the judiciary. The "omnipotence of Parliament," said Sir Frederick Pollock, "was first formally adopted . . . in Blackstone's Commentaries." 22 Without mentioning either Coke or Holt, Blackstone acknowledged that "it is generally laid down more largely, that acts of parliament contrary to reason are void," but rejected the proposition because "to set the judicial power above that of the legislature . . . would be subversive of all government," 2 3 --a statement that 150 years of American history effectively refutes. Madison certainly did not conceive in 1785 that Parliament had become uncontrollable, for he stated, "'The Judiciary Department merits every care [.] Its efficacy is Demonstrated in G. Brittain where it maintains private Right against all the corruptions of the two other departments .
".
. 24 Sound or not, Coke's statement became a rallying cry for the Colonists when it was resoundingly invoked by Otis: if an Act of Parliament had the effect claimed, he argued, it would be "against the Constitution" and therefore void." His argument put a legal footing 21 S. MORISON, THE OXFORD HIsTORY OF THE AmmcAN PEoPLE 178 (1965) . The judicial tenure provision of the Act of Settlement was designed to stiffen judicial backbones against royal encroachments. C. MCILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIA-MENT AND ITS SUPREMACY 77 (1910) . True, the Act of Settlement of 1700 made judges removable on an address of both Houses of Parliament, but that procedure had not been employed prior to 1787, and was employed for the first and only time in 1830, when an Irish judge was removed. H. W. R. WADE In fact, Blackstone had not quite sorted out his own ideas. Although he stated that parliament enjoyed uncontrollable power, even to enact unreasonable laws, id., he uneasily noted that "the omnipotence of parliament" is "a figure rather too bold." Id. at *161. He repeated the traditional learning that "no human law has any validity, if contrary to" natural law. Id. at *41. He also emphasized that the "absolute rights" of Englishment included "personal security," "personal liberty," and "private property," id. at *127, *129, and stated that the law "will not authorize the least violation of" private property. Id. at *139.
In his contribution to the ENcYcLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (1953 ed.) on Blackstone, F. W. Sherwood states that "Whether through the natural conservatism of a lawyer, or through his own tinidity and subserviency as a man and a politician, he is always found to be a specious defender of the existing order of things." Id. at 687. under Colonial resistance, and gave a fresh vitality to Coke that is evidenced by a number of citations in the years that immediately followed. 26 The most extensive exposition was that of James Varnum in the 1786 Rhode Island "paper-money" case, Trevett v. Weeden, a cause cl6bre which Varnum broadcast in pamphlet form. 2 T If these citations are scattered, they are countered by only one citation of Blackstone." 8 And the statements by Lieutenant-Governor Thomas Hutchinson in Massachusetts, that "the people in general" relied on Coke, indicate that such reliance was not limited to published citations.2 Thus, the argument that Coke had been discredited does not rest on Holt, see text accompanying notes 120-22 infra. But as Professor Bailyn notes, Otis' contemporaries were "unencumbered by Otis' complexities," BAILYx 180, and they fastened on the idea that an act contrary to the Constitution is void. This was the argument made by John Adams, with Otis concurring, in 1765, in opposition to the Stamp Act. Memorial of Boston, Quin. 200, 202 (1765).
What "Constitution," asks Professor Bailyn, BAILYN 176. I would say, the only "Constitution" that was known to a 17th-or 18th-century lawyer, the "supremacy of law," which is discussed below. Lieutenant-Governor Hutchinson did not misunderstand, for he wrote on September 12, 1765: "[O]ur friends to liberty take the advantage of a maxim they find in Lord Coke that an Act of Parliament against Magna Carta or the peculiar rights of Englishmen is ipso facto void." Quoted in Plucknett 63. Similar deductions had been drawn by Justice Symonds in Massachusetts 100 years earlier, see note 118 infra. So too, Jefferson regarded Coke as profoundly learned in the "orthodox doctrine of the British Constitution or what is called British rights," quoted in E. Co~wiN, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 31 n.45 (1914), rights which Blackstone himself considered to be "absolute." See note 23 supra. In 18th-century America, Bailyn tells us, "It was taken as a maxim by all . . .that it was the function of the judges 'to settle the contests between prerogative and liberty . . . to ascertain the bounds of sovereign power, and to determine the rights of the subject," BAILYw 74. When the Colonists felt themselves threatened by legislative oppression they not unnaturally again looked to the judges to "ascertain the bounds of sovereign power, and to determine" their rights. 26 When Justice William Cushing, later a member of the Supreme Court, wrote John Adams, "I can tell the grand jury the nullity of acts of parliament," Adams replied, "You have my hearty concurrence in telling the jury the nullity of acts of parliament." 9 J. ADAMS, WoRxs 391 n. 29 In Massachusetts, Lieutenant-Governor Hutchinson wrote in September, 1765, that "the prevailing reason [among "the people in general"] at this time is, that the Act of Parliament is against the Magna Charta and the natural rights of Englishmen, and therefore according to Lord Coke null and void." Quoted in Plucknett 63. Iredell's statement in 1787 likewise reflects acceptance of Coke's doctrine. While noticing the alleged "absolute power" of Parliament, he stated that "any act passed, not inconsistent with natural justice (for that curb is avowed by the judges even in England)" would be binding. 2 G. J. McREE eighteenth-century judicial repudiation, but on inferences drawn from Blackstone's principle of "legislative supremacy," " which the Founders categorically rejected.,"
Today criticism of Bonham's Case as a "foundation" of judicial review is more apt to be that Coke merely stated "a familiar common law canon of [statutory] construction rather than a constitutional theory." " Shortly stated by Professor Bailyn, the argument is that "Coke had not meant . . . 'that there were superior principles of right and justice which Acts of Parliament might not contravene'." By "saying that courts might 'void' a legislative provision that violated the constitution he meant only that the courts were to construe statutes so as to bring them into conformity with recognized legal principles." 8
For purposes of the present discussion it suffices to state that Bonham was summoned to appear before the Royal College of Physicians, and after examination was found deficient in medical science, fined 100 shillings and forbidden under pain of imprisoument to practice until he had been admitted to the College. When Bonham continued to practice, he was committed to prison, after further proceedings, by the Censors of the College, and thereupon brought an action for false imprisonment. The issue to be examined is whether the Royal College of Physicians was empowered by statute to fine unlicensed, as distinguished from incompetent, physicians, and more particularly the Fourth reason adduced by Coke to deny the power. 802 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 941 (1953) . 31 The influence of Blackstone on the Colonies is discussed in chapter 2 of my forthcoming book. Here I shall mention only a few highlights. Gouverneur Morris stated in 1785 before the Pennsylvania Assembly "that the boasted omnipotence of legislative authority is but a jingle of words . . . . [F]reemen must feel it to be absurd and unconstitutional." 3 J. SPARKS, THE: LnFa OF GOUVERNEUR MoRRis 438 (1832) .
In the North Carolina Ratification Convention, Maclaine noticed Blackstone's view that "the power of Parliament is transcendent and absolute" and then asked, "Has any man said that the legislature can deviate from this Constitution?
The legislature . . . . cannot travel beyond its bounds." 4 J. EL.IOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTIruToN 63 (2d ed. 1888). Iredell, a leader of the North Carolina convention, and later a Justice of the Supreme Court, stated in a 1786 address respecting the formation of the North Carolina constitution:
It was, of course, to be considered how to impose restrictions on the legislature . . .
[to] guard against the abuse of unlimited power, which was not to be trusted, without the most imminent danger, to any man or body of men on earth. We had not only been sickened and disgusted for years with the high and almost impious language from Great Britain, of the omnipotent power of the British Parliament, but had severely smarted under its effects. We . . . should have been guilty of . . . grossest folly, if in the same moment when we spurned at the insolent despotism of Great Britain, we had established a despotic power among ourselves. Theories were nothing to us, opposed to our own severe experience.
2 G. J. McREE Since the College was to receive one half of the fine, said Coke, it was judge in its own cause-a practice contrary to the common law:
[I]t appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law will controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void . . . .
Let it be assumed that Coke construed the statute as not conferring power to fine in the premises because that construction would render it void-in modem terms, a construction to avoid "constitutional" doubt. To describe Coke's statement as a "canon of [statutory] construction" by no means, however, exhausts its implications; there remains his affirmation that a statute which makes a party judge in his own cause is contrary to "common right and reason" and therefore void. That statement is not deprived of constitutional significance because it was uttered in the process of "construction." We would, of course, be attributing to Coke an as yet undreamed of conceptualization were we to conclude that he deemed himself engaged in fashioning constitutional theory. Nevertheless, attachment of the label "construction" to the germinal concept-an Act of Parliament that makes a party judge in his own cause is against "reason" and void-does not make what we term the "constitutional" problem disappear. Strictly speaking, so far as the Fourth reason goes, there was no problem of "construction." As Professor Thorne justly states, "The words . . . were straightforward" 3 5 -they plainly made the College judge in its own cause. But I would not agree that in interpreting these words Coke "was concerned only with the application of a statute." 86 This was not the case of excepting the single, unjust application of words that generally were applicable justly." 7 Rather this part of the Act was void in the only application it might have. 35 Thorne, Introduction, supra note 7, at 85.
86 "Coke was concerned only with the application of a statute that led to results 'encounter common droit & reason,' not with the theory that 'an Act of Parliament may be void from its first Creation' because of a conflict between its provisions and fundamental, natural, or 'higher' law." Id. at 89.
37 "St Germain recognized [certain cases 'in which statutes had not been applied in particular cases because of the injustice that would ensue'] as . . . . . . an exception of the law of god, or the law of reason, from the general rules of the law of man, when they by reason of their generalty would in any particular case judge against the law of god, or the law of reason' . . ." Id. at 78.
The law of nature and of reason, states Holdsworth, required "abstract justice to be done in each individual case, even at the cost of dispensing (if necessary) with the law of the state." W. HOLDSWORTH, Som MAnams oF ENGLiSr LAW 93 (1938).
Even as an "exception" to avoid an unjust "application" the rationale differed little from the general rule which governed laws in conflict with the law of reason. See text accompanying notes 45, 46, 50 infra.
Professor Thorne has put the issue into sharper focus: Did Coke mean that the statute was void ab initio or merely "ineffective"?
Coke seems to be asserting that there were acts of Parliament void ab initio since they conflicted with common right and reason, but if this interpretation of his words is adopted one has difficulty in explaining both the absence of the familiar passages in the Doctor and Student, and elsewhere, that might have been usefully cited, and his references in the same sentence to repugnant statutes and acts impossible to be performed. Such acts he likewise considered "void," but clearly that section of an act which is inconsistent with another portion of it need only be considered ineffective, nor need the authority and validity of a statute that it is impossible to apply be impugned."
Coke, continues Professor Thorne, must be understood to say that "in many cases the common law will control acts of parliament"-that is, will restrict their words in order to reach sound results; and "sometimes it will adjudge them to be completely void"-that is, will reject them completely if modification cannot serve. 3 9
One who would take issue with Professor Thorne must tread warily, for it is he who has made us aware of the shifting currents in the early centuries and of the need for assaying judicial treatment of statutes in light of the developing and changing authority of Parliament. 40 Nevertheless, his analysis stirs doubts in my mind, doubts that I set forth with deference, realizing that my suggestions may excite still other doubts. In my view, there is little or no evidence that the distinction drawn between void ab initio and "ineffectiveness" played an appreciable role in Coke's time. Our own theorizing to one side, a seventeenth-century lawyer and a later Colonial might well have understood-as, in fact, they did-Coke to mean simpliciter that no Act of Parliament could contravene "fundamental" law. But first a closer look at the suggested distinction.
To begin with Coke's omission to cite the "familiar passages" that he "had used . . . in Calvin's Case," "' a case decided only two 38 Thorne, Introduction, supra note 7, at 86-87 (footnotes omitted).
39
Id. at 88.
40 See Thorne, Introduction, supra note 7; Thorne, The Equity of a Statute and Heydoi's Case, 31 ILL. L. Rev. 202 (1936) . His analysis of Bonham in terms of statutory construction rather than constitutional theory has been widely accepted.
See, e.g., 2 J. ADAMs, LEGAL years before Bonham, argued by almost all the notables of the day, and decided by the Lord Chancellor and twelve judges. Coke himself observed that the case was "the longest and weightiest that ever was argued in any Court." 42 There Coke had said that "the law of nature is part of the law of England"; he cited Doctor and Student (a work published in 1518) for the proposition that it is "immutable," and went on to say, Parliament could not take away that protection which the law of nature giveth unto him; and therefore notwithstanding that statute, the King may protect and pardon him. 4 "
Here was judicial recognition that "notwithstanding statute" a subject could not be deprived of rights protected by the law of nature.
Why didn't Coke cite Doctor and Student in Bonham? The argument from silence is inconclusive, and against it may be urged that having recently examined the point in a "great case" wherein Coke had said that law on the point "appeareth plainly and plentifully in our books," "' he might well have felt no need to repeat citations for a point so generally accepted and so recently reiterated. From Coke's citation of Doctor and Student, it may also be inferred that he employed "reason" as equivalent to the law of nature, for that dialogue stated that "The law of nature . . . is also called the law of reason," and that English lawyers were accustomed to say that if anything "be prohibited by the law of nature . . . it is against reason," precisely the words employed by Coke. 45 Under those circumstances a seventeenth-century lawyer might reasonably assume that Coke's "against reason" was the familiar version of "against the law of nature." 46 From this important consequences flow. Gough states that "we need not read more into Coke's opinion than a willingness . . . to adopt a strict interpretation of the law. We can find support for this in Bacon's speech on Calvin's behalf in the course of the same case." GOUGH 45. Because, said Bacon, "civil and national laws" "tend to abridge the law of nature, the law favoureth not them, but takes them strictly . . . ." Calvin's Case, 2 How. St Tr. 559, 595 (C.P. 1608). With Bacon's argument in his ears, Coke significantly chose to speak, not in terms of strict construction, but of "protection" "notwithstanding that statute." 7 Co. Rep The "foundation of all laws," he said, is the "principle, which likewise all our lawyers recognize, that if any law or custom be contrary to the law of God or of nature, or in fine, to reason, it shall not be held a valid law." 7 J. MILTON Medieval law, said Gierke, "declared that every act of the Sovereign which broke the bounds drawn by Natural Law was formally null and void." 47 It is safe to say that early English lawyers would have agreed. 4 " Gough considers that we must extend "belief in natural law from medieval lawyers to lawyers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries," " as in fact Coke recorded in Calvin's Case. Gierke's version of medieval law was that of Doctor and Student:
if any law made by [man], bind any person to any thing that is against the said laws [of "reason"], it is no law, but a corruption, and manifest error. 50
On the justifiable assumption that Coke, who had cited Doctor and Student in 1608, meant by his 1610 reference to "against reason" to state the law of nature summarily, we may infer that he meant the Act was void ab initio-if the refined distinction we now draw occurred to him at all.
Does his use of "void" to comprehend "repugnant or impossible to perform" compel the inference that he merely meant "ineffective"? "Artificial Reasons" as a Context for Modern Basic Legal Theory, 84 L.Q. REv. 330, 338 (1968) . "For Coke . . . law is a work of reason in this sense, that it is the nature of law to be reasonable; and the test of its reasonableness, he thinks, is its ability to withstand the test of time." Id. at 339. A Colonial who read his remarks in Calvin's Case might justly conclude that Coke believed that a statute had to yield to the law of nature or "reason" in its "orthodox sense." 47Quoted in C. McILwAIN Coke had lumped together Acts that were "against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed," and all three were indifferently cited as examples of Acts that courts would adjudge to be utterly void." The word "impossible" was discussed in 1673 by Chief Justice Vaughan as if it were analogous to a breach of natural law, and so too of "contradictions" " which being "impossible to obey" were "no law." 52 Vaughan was far closer in time and therefore perhaps in sympathetic understanding to Coke than are we; consequently Coke's enumeration of "impossible" and "repugnant" makes it no more difficult to conclude that by "void" he meant null ab initio than to arrive at "ineffective." The fact that language suggesting "ineffective" was employed on one occasion, 5 3 whereas reference was made to "void" on another, does not without more indicate that the judges had a firm distinction in mind. There is danger of reading back into Coke's mind a differentiation that is clear enough today but to which a seventeenth-century lawyer may have been oblivious.' To give a meaning to words in the process of "construction" that was "quite contrary to the text" in order to make 5 1 Thorne has called attention to early learning explaining "repugnancy" in terms of "contradiction": But what yf the wordes of an estatute be contraryant or repugnant, what is there then to be saide? And suerelie thern we ought to make our construccion as nyghe as we can in suche sorte that nothinge be repugnant; yet yf yt can not be avoided but that a repugnancie must nedes be, then is the former sayenge good & the thynge repugnant voide . . . . and therefore are the former wordes good and the later, because they make a jarre by reason of the repugnancye, shalbe omytted. A DiscouasE UPoN THE Exposiciow AND UNDERSTAxNDiGE OF STATUTES 132-33 (S. Thorne ed. 1942). Probably the Discourse was written before 1567. See Professor Thorne's Introduction, at 11. See also Thorne, Dr. Bonhan's Case, 54 L.Q. REv. 543, 549 (1938).
5 2 MAter explaining that murder signifies unlawful killing, stealing is unlawful taking, and that a royal "dispensation" (i.e., an authorization to kill as distinguished from a pardon after the fact) would make them "lawful," Chief justice Vaughan said, "So the same thing, at the same time, would be both lawful and unlawful, which is impossible.
"For the same reason, a law making murder, stealing [etc.] lawful, would be a void law in itself.
"For a law which a man cannot obey, nor act according to it, is void, and no law: and it is impossible to obey contradictions, or act according to them." Thomas v. Sorrell, Vaughan 330, 336-37, 124 Eng. Rep. 1098, 1102 (Ex. 1673). Is it far-fetched to infer that for Vaughan "impossible" and "contradiction" (repugnancy) were synonymous with "against reason" or "against the law of nature"? 53 Thorne, Introduction, supra note 7, at 87 n.186. 5 4 What Mcllwain has said is relevant: "Institutions that are now narrow and definite become as we trace them back indistinguishable from others that we have always considered equally definite. . . . To read the same definiteness into the earlier institutions is not necessarily to put words into men's mouths which they never uttered, but it is to put ideas into their heads that they never dreamed of." McILLwAI, supra note 47, at 146-47. Compare Thorne, Introduction, supra, note 7, 28: "No judge or serjeant had regarded the nonextension of an act to ancient demesne as an 'exception out' of the statute, accomplished through an exercise of judicial discretion, for to say that ancient demesne was bound by an enactment but saved from its operation is a refinement (superfluous in a private-law scheme) for which no contemporary support can be found." them agree with "reason" " might well have appeared to that lawyer as "nullification" in fact. Would it ultimately matter to him that a crucial portion of a statute was held void from its creation rather than because the contradictory, "repugnant" section must be "omytted"? 56 The difference matters to us because we attach importance to concepts, such as the separation of powers, which were as yet unborn." To the mind of the seventeenth-century lawyer, we may conjecture, rejection of a statute as "ineffective"-rejection, to borrow Thorne's phrase, "completely if modification cannot serve"-would as effectively negate it for practical purposes as would a flat declaration that it was "no law" and void, as indeed Chief Justice Vaughan was not much later to say about "impossible" and "contradiction." ," And so much may be deduced from the excoriation of Coke by his eminent contemporary, Lord Ellesmere, for "reversing" the Parliament, for "trampling upon" and "blowing away" an Act of Parliament "as vain, and of no value." '9 If the distinction we draw today between "ineffective" and "void ab initio" lurks in Coke's phrase, Ellesmere's diatribes suggest that it was then of no practical consequence.
What Coke failed to state-"the theory that any act of the sovereign that broke the bounds of natural law was formally null and void"-was, in Professor Thorne's view, "soon advanced" by Chief Justice Hobart." 0 Patently restating Bonham, though without mention of it, 6 Hobart said, "even an Act of Parliament, made against natural equity, as to make a man Judge in his own case, is void in it self, for jura naturae sunt immutabilia, and they are leges legum." ' So far as I can discern, Hobart differed from Coke's statement in Bonham only in substituting "natural equity" for "common right and reason" and in including the Latin phrase, which Coke had earlier quoted in
We are cited to no use of the words "ab initio" in the present context by Coke or his predecessors; they said only that when positive law contravenes natural law it is no law . Chief Justice Vaughan said the same thing about "impossible" and "contradictions". In 1712, counsel apparently seeking to restrain application of the Bonham doctrine to a "very clear case," posited that it meant "void ab initio. " Let us now consider the matter in the perspective of "constitutional theory." Commenting on judicial disregard of statutes in the fourteenth century, Plucknett stated that "constitutional questions" "were not asked." If it was desirable to neglect some words of a statute, then they were quietly set aside, but in doing so neither counsel nor judges enquired into the nature of statutes and legislation, the sovereignty of Parliament, the supremacy of the common law, the functions of the judicature, and all the other questions which the modern mind finds so absorbingly interesting. 64 Professor Thorne arrived at the same conclusion. 5 This "free and easy attitude" begins to disappear in the middle of the fourteenth century, we are told by Plucknett; " yet as we pass through the fifteenth century into the age of Coke, "the power of the courts to construe or misconstrue legislation was unimpaired, and indeed increased.. Plowden . . . gloried in the liberty which the courts enjoyed in playing fast and loose with statutes." 67 All this to be sure was in the domain of "private law," "public law" being still in the womb of the future. But as Professor Thorne observes, "That rights would have been infringed or unjust results would have ensued upon the application of a statute had previously (1936) . In Thorne, Introduction, supra note 7, at 71, he refers to "a group of decisions that permitted acts of Parliament phrased in unambiguous terms to be completely disregarded since they led to results that were considered improper. No principle of jurisprudence or political theory that might serve as an explanation was offered." (footnote omitted). 66 PLucxNETT, CoNcIsE HISTORY, supra note 48, at 315. And that, which law and reason allows, shall be taken to be in force against the words of statutes." Holdsworth explains that "the rules of equity are really special applications of the overriding law of God or of reason or nature to the treatment by merely human law of particular cases." 4 W. HoLDswORTH, supra note 45, at 280.
In the 16th century, states Professor Thorne, "statutes were not yet thought to be exact formulas emanating from supreme parliamentary authority." Thorne, Introduction, supra note 7, at 56. The whereabouts of sovereignty at this point, i.e., the need to have a sovereign power somewhere, was but dimly understood by Parliament itself. See text accompanying note 71 infra.
[before the sixteenth century] been sufficient to hold it ineffective." 88 It is therefore of no moment in weighing Bonhan and its seventeenthcentury successors that they "had nothing to do with the great constitutional questions of the age," and that "[t]hey were entirely private disputes." ' For the important thing, the seed from which "constitutional theory" was to germinate, is that when a statute was deemed to unjustly prejudice one of the parties to a "private dispute," Coke, like his predecessors, was ready to shelter private rights from statutory infringement.
By importing our own preoccupations into analysis of Bonham we becloud the issue that faced Coke. Coke was not confronted with a dispute with Parliament but with an existing statute that impinged on private rights, and the pivot of his thinking, I hazard, was protection of private rights rather than a challenge to Parliament. To Coke "the question of whether the legislature was sovereign or non-sovereign did not occur, and indeed did not arise." 70 Parliament itself was "slow to understand" the "whereabouts of the sovereign power of the state"; and Holdsworth remarked that Coke "hardly saw" the necessity "to have a sovereign power somewhere." 7' There was no occasion to fashion a new theory to deal with a statute which invaded private rights; he could meet the case before him by resort to the old. For him "the political theory [supremacy of the law] which he found in his medieval law books," said Holdsworth, "was good enough for the seventeenth century .. . . . Little or no reason exists to saddle him with our refined analysis, with a belief in the separation of powers and judicial review, concepts that were formulated much later. 73 68 Thorne, Introduction, supra note 7, at 41. 69 GOUGH 49. Speaking of the later distinction "between the Laws of Property and those of Government," Plucknett observes that "To the middle ages they were all one." Plucknett, supra note 5, at 52. As a conscious bearer of the medieval tradition, albeit on the threshold of modern political thought, Coke, one may hazard, found no occasion to draw the distinction. Even in the early 17th century, it would appear, "every litigated issue of constitutional right was primarily a question of private law, was raised by private law procedure, and was settled not as an affair of state but as a matter of general law." Goebel, Constitutional History and Constitutional Law, 38 COLUm. L. Rxv. 555, 559 (1938) . 70 But if our conceptualization of "judicial review" was unknown to him, the notion of "fundamental law" was not. Pickthorn refers to the "medieval idea of the supremacy of the law, an idea of which it is hardly too much to say that before the sixteenth century it was all there was in England in the way of a constitution, [and] that during the seventeenth century it was most of what there was . . . . " 4 Coke, we have seen, believed in the overriding force of the law of nature, and with Bacon, he believed that Magna Carta was unalterable. 75 English subjects considered that their rights and liberties were protected against the King's prerogative, and in 1628 Coke himself joined in assertion of the claim. 76 laws, 78 so that an appeal to fundamental law against a statute was entirely logical. 9 "All through his life," said Holdsworth, Coke "had held firmly to the [idea] that the law must be supreme . . . . " When Bonham came down, Parliament was struggling for power and as yet could lay no claim to a greater than royal prerogative. Indeed, the arguments used by the parliamentary opposition against overweening royal claims "encouraged the belief that in the common law there might be found a store of principles which could be used to demonstrate the illegality of particular exercises of arbitrary power." s' One who, like Coke, could proffer the Petition of Right (1628), which grew out of his bill "for the better securing of every freeman touching the propriety of his goods and liberty of his person," 8' in the teeth of arrogant claims to absolute royal power, would hardly shrink from condemning an infringing arbitrary statute. There is no need to assume that Englishmen who were preparing to shed their blood in defense of their rights against royal arbitrariness were ready to suffer arbitrariness at the hands of their own elected Parliament. They turned to Parliament because they trusted it to protect their rights against royal despotism, not to substitute parliamentary tyranny. As Jefferson 78 "No human law which was contrary to these universal laws was valid." 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 48, at 280. See also note 75 mipra. 79 GOUGr 49, says of Bonha's Case and Day v. Savadge, that fundamental law was not mentioned in them. Coke and his colleagues certainly talked of fundamental law (though not in court), and there was indeed a connexion between this idea and their judicial decisions, but it was only a connexion, not an identity. Indeed there could not be an identity, for fundamental law in the seventeenth century was an ill-defined term which covered a wide field, and could not be identified with any one thing. Nevertheless, Gough states that "Fundamental laws (and Magna Carta itself) were valued for the protection they afforded against the arbitrary power of kings." Id. at 65. He also called attention to "other passages in Coke's writings which lend colour to the theory that he believed in the existence of a body of fundamental law." Id. at 40. Compare Coke's statement that a statute contrary to the Magna Carta "shall be holden for none." 3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES *111. In his Postscript, GOUGH 222, adds that "In the seventeenth century it was constitutional limitations to absolute powergenerally to the power of the monarchy, but sometimes also to the power of parliament-which above all were claimed as fundamental." If Coke and his fellows did not attach the label "fundamental" to the law of nature or "reason" or "natural equity," it was certainly so regarded in the particular case. Coke left no doubt that Magna Carta was "fundamental," and presumably he felt no need to separate and ticket the various strands of fundamental law. 80 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 48, at 454 (3d ed. 1945). Said Holdsworth, "According to Coke's view, the common law was the supreme law in the state, and the judges, unfettered and uncontrolled save by the law, were the sole exponents of this supreme law." W. HOLDSWORTH, SOME MAKERS OF ENGLISH LAW 115 (1938). Coke "preserved the medieval idea of the supremacy of the law, at a time when political speculation was tending to assert the necessity of the supremacy of a sovereign person or body, which was above the law . . . ." Id. at 126. The "establishment of the rule of law" was "due mainly to Coke's insistence on the supremacy of the common law." Id. at 131-32. 81 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 48, at 435 (3d ed. 1945).
was to say many years later, after the battle against Parliament had been won and the issue was arbitrariness of state legislatures, "An elective despotism was not the government we fought for." 8 Having no reason to suspect that Parliament would be arbitrary, Coke could assume that there was no deliberate arbitrariness in the statute before him, the more so because "Parliament had always contended for the medieval idea of the supremacy of the law." 84 Untroubled by "parliamentary sovereignty," he could, like his predecessors, decide the "private dispute" without reference to "constitutional questions." If no predecessor had actually declared that an act which contravened natural law is void," 5 many acts had been "quietly set aside" for the protection of private rights. Coke's advance was to make the tacit explicit, to identify a statute as an Act of Parliament, to articulate judicially what was generally accepted doctrine-a law contrary to "reason" is void-to proceed from "quietly" setting a statute aside "upon the dictate of legal reasonableness" 11 to explicit recognition that a statute contrary to "reason" is to be declared void-a process to which we assign the label "nullification." 87 That Coke believed himself covered by early precedents does not, in my view, militate against an appeal to "any 'fundamental, higher, or natural law.' " 88 Plucknett states that Coke "added" his "common right and reason" to one of his early citations wherein the court had merely "ignored" the statute, 9
83T. JEFrFRsox, Notes on Virginia *214, in 3 WRITINGS 68, 224 (P. Ford ed.
1892-1899)
. See also the statement of Iredell, quoted in 2 G. J. McRE, Ln Am CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL, 145-46 (1858). 846 W. HoLDSWORTH, supra note 48, at 243 (2d ed. 1937). Compare note 76 supra. Holdsworth remarks on the "old alliance between Parliament and the common law, to which in the past both the common law and the Parliament had owed so much." 5 W. HoLDswoRTH, upra note 48, at 444 (3d ed. 1945). 8 5 PLUCKNETT, CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 48, at 319: "[Wle do not find in mediaeval English cases any decisions which clearly hold that a statute is void because it contravenes some fundamental principle." According to Gough "we shall look in vain for a case where statutes were actually nullified by a judicial decision." GOUGH 145. And compare Gough's reference to "judicial nullification, or judicial review." Id. at 48. 
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In citing an ancient case wherein the court had merely "ignored" the statute, Coke, in Bonliam's Case, "added" the phrase "because it would be against common right and reason, the common law adjudges the said act of parliament as to that point void." Plucknett, supra note 5, at 36.
In 1320, Hugh le Despenser and his son complained to King Edward II of an award of banishment made by the assembled barons as being made "wrongfully against the laws and usages of the realm, and against common right and reason." Case of Hugh le Despenser (K.B. 1320), 1 How. St. Tr. 23, 33 (1809). thereby equating a "quiet" setting aside with an application of the law of "reason." " When this is viewed in light of his assertion in Calvin's Case that "Parliament could not take away that protection which the law of nature giveth unto" a subject, 9 1 his later statement in the Institutes that if a statute "be made to the contrary of Magna Carta, it shall be holden for none," 12 as well as the fact that his phrase, '"against common right and reason," may fairly be regarded as shorthand for the law of nature and Magna Carta, it is easier, for me at least, to regard these several expressions as parts of a coherent politicallegal theory rather than unrelated, compartmentalized utterances. 93 Other arguments have been advanced for the view that Coke was only engaged in statutory construction. It has been maintained that the juxtaposition of the Fifth reason-that unless the two clauses of the statute were distinct an unlicensed physician would be liable to a fine under the first clause and also to a fine under the second, an absurdity, for no one should be punished twice for the same offense 94_ with the Fourth reason, "against common right and reason," supports this view. Professor Thorne would read Coke's argument thus: "just as it would be absurd to interpret the statute [to permit two punishments for one offense] so it would be absurd to interpret it to permit the college to be party and judge, that is to assess fines in which it shares." " Brownlow's report of Bonham does indeed state that if the college shall be "judges and parties also," this is "absurd." " But in his own report Coke was at pains to confine his argument of absurdity to the Fifth reason; and we should not be too quick to join what he kept asunder. Moreover, points out Plucknett, Coke had "added" to the report of the ancient Cessavit 42, cited in support of the Fourth reason, the words "because it would be against common right and reason, the common law adjudges the said Act of Parliament as to that point void," I when, according to Plucknett, "the statute is 90Under Coke's reasoning, "The newer decisions had not changed the law-they had merely developed or explained the truth to be found concealed in the oldest authorities." 5 W. not held void; it is just ignored." 9 Such pains are incompatible with an attempt merely to restate "absurdity" in novel and involved fashion, but breathe rather an intention to furnish an additional reason. With Plucknett I would say that in his Fourth reason "Coke has really added an explanation and a theory all his own," 99 adding only that it was an explanation rooted in the past. There remains the other portion of the Fourth reason, the phrase "repugnant or impossible to be performed." Repugnancy, Professor Thorne concluded from an early seventeenth-century treatise on statutory construction, is "a contradiction; it occurs when a statute provides one thing, and then through oversight perhaps, its opposite," '00 in which case, according to the treatise, "are the former wordes good and the later, because they make a jarre by reason of the repugnancye, shalbe omytted." "' Faced by contradictory provisions a court would save something from the collision rather than let the statute fail; and Professor Thorne justly infers that there "is no conscious constitutional problem raised here, but only one of statutory construction." 102 He then suggests that "Though not technically a repugnancy, certainly a statute making a man judge in his own case and a self-contradictory statute might well be regarded as cognate," 103 a conclusion to which the precedents might have led Coke. But why dress that result in an additional formula when "impossibility and repugnancy" might have sufficed, particularly since he imposed his "against reason" gloss on Cessavit 42, and because his reference to "against reason" suggests a reference to the law of nature which no act could contravene?
Still another comment by Coke needs to be taken into account; in his Second Institute, Coke, explaining an old case wherein the statute provided that the assize should not be held except in the counties of the parties concerned, said that a writ was allowed out of the county so that a party in a particular case would not be both judge and party lest "he should have right and no remedy by Law given for the wrong done unto him, which the Law will not suffer, and therefore this case of necessity is by construction excepted out 93 Plucknett, supra note 5, at 36. 99 Id. He said it was a "revival" of earlier "law." Id. at 45. 543, 549 (1938) . Coke, it seems to me, was too fastidious to regard mere "contradiction" as "cognate" with the judgeparty situation that was morally "wrong" and inala in se. One need only recall that he did not follow Bacon's suggestion of "strict interpretation" in Calvins Case (see note 43 supra) that he eschewed the argument of "absurdity" in the Fourth reason which he then made in the Fifth reason, see text accompanying notes 94-98 supra, and that he preferred not to rest on an "exception by construction," an argument which his fellow Judge Daniel was ready to adopt, see text accompanying notes 106-07 infra. of the Statute." 104 "More pointed comment on Bonham's case," says Gough, "is hardly needed." ' Coke, however, plainly avoided putting his decision in Bonham on "exception by construction." Justice Daniel was prepared to rule that a doctor was excepted from the Act,' 016 but Coke stated that he did not speak to this point because "he and Warburton and Daniel agreed, that this action was clearly maintainable for two other points." 10' Bonhamn cannot therefore be explained in terms of a statutory construction doctrine which Coke, by his own statement of the case, felt it unnecessary to consider.
Such doubts about Coke's meaning as might have been entertained by a Colonial lawyer might well have been dispelled by the strictures of Lord Ellesmere. In his address at the installation of Sir Henry Montague as successor to Coke as Lord Chief Justice, Ellesmere called attention to the demotion of Montague's predecessor and admonished Sir Henry to follow the practice of his own grandfather "when he sate Chief Justice in the Common Pleas." He did not claim for the judges power to judge Statutes and Acts of Parliament to be void, if they conceived them to be against common right and reason [a shaft at Coke] ; but left the King and the Parliament to judge what was common right and reason. I speak not of impossibilities or direct repugnances)'
Professor Thorne suggests that the qualifying adjective "direct" seems to indicate that to Ellesmere "Coke's theory was directed toward interpretation broadened to indirect repugnances, that is, contradictions not on the statute's face." ' Ellesmere, however, "left the King and Parliament to judge what was common right and reason"; from this area judges were excluded, while he carefully preserved for them the right to consider legitimate "repugnancy." His separation of "repugnancy" from "right and reason" indicates concern with a differentiation of functions rather than a sharpening of definition to guide the judges. His qualifying "direct" repugnancy is of a piece with his counsel not to "strain the statute" or to make "an absurd or inept new construction." 110 Judicial exercise of a power "left to King and Parliament" was something else again-this was to overthrow, rather than to misconstrue, a statute. [to the College] was confirmed, blowing them both away as vain, and of no value," "' once more indicating that he was taking aim at Coke's declaration that a statute was void because "against reason."
Let us move from Coke to Hobart, Chief Justice of Common Pleas who, in Day v. Savadge, stated that "even an Act of Parliament, made against natural equity, as to make a man Judge in his own case, is void in it self, for jura naturae sunt immutabilia, and they are leges legum." 114 Here the Bonham "against reason" stands alone, unaccompanied by "repugnancy"; and Hobart's reference to the immutable law of nature again suggests that Coke employed "reason" in the sense earlier explained by Doctor and Student. Plucknett observes, "Clearly, then, in Hobart's opinion, the truth of [the Bonham] doctrine was beyond dispute." 115 At least a Colonial lawyer might so conclude.
Additional conformation for such a reading is furnished by a treatise published in 1627 by Sir Henry Finch, Serjeant-at-Law, wherein he stated, "[I]t is truly said, & all men must agree, that lawes in deed repugnant to the law of reason are as well void as those that cross the law of nature." "' This, says Gough, "indicates the atmosphere in which lawyers were educated in the seventeenth century" n and to a Colonial lawyer who did not bring finely-honed modern scholarship to the exegesis of Finch, the latter might well seem to justify acceptance of Coke's "against common right and reason" at face value. 118 Consider too Bishop Burnett's summary of the 1676 debate on the exclusion of the Duke of York from the Succession: "All lawyers had great regard to fundamental laws. And it was a great maxim among our lawyers, that even an act of Parliament against Magna Carta was null of itself." :" Praise of Coke's statement came in 1702 from no less a figure than Chief Justice Holt:
[W]hat my Lord Coke says in Dr. Bonham's case . . . is far from any extravagancy, for it is a very reasonable and true saying, that if an Act of Parliament should ordain that the same person should be party and Judge . . . it would be a void Act of Parliament; for it is impossible that one should be Judge and party . . . and an Act of Parliament can do 115 Plucknett, supra note 5, at 49. 116 H. FINcH, LAW OR A DiscouRsE THEREOF 76 (1627), quoted in GOUGH, supra note 3, at 34. 117 GOUGH, supra note 3, at 34. 118 A 1657 Massachusetts case, Gidding v. Browne (Ipswich, Mass. 1657), 2 HUTCEINSoN PAPERs 1 (Prince Soc'y Pub. 1865) exhibits that understanding. A town meeting had voted 100 pounds for the gift of a house to the minister; some of the minority refused to pay, were distrained and brought suit. Justice Symonds held for them, saying that "fundamental law" incfuded "[t]hat every subject shall and may enjoy what he hath a civell right or title unto, soe as it cannot be taken from him." Id. at 1, 2. Arguing "from the greater to the lesse," Symonds said that "if noe kinge or parliament can justly enact and cause that one mans estate, in whole or part, may be taken from him and given to another without his owne consent, then surely the major part of a towne or other inferior powers cannot doe it." Id. at 5. He cited the 1627 Finch treatise: "lawes positive doe lose their force and are hoe lawes at all, which are directly contrary to . . . fundamentall [law]." Id. at 5. Justice Symonds was reversed by the General Court, not because his principles were rejected, but because, the Court found, such a gift to the minister was lawful and customary, the minority were heard at the town meeting, and the vote was carried by a majority and was binding on the minority. Id. at 22-23.
Justice Symonds' view was in part embodied in the MASSACHUS=rS CONsIrru-TION OF 1780, first part, art. X: "no part of the property of any individual, can, with justice, be taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his own consent, or that of the representative body of the people. . . . And whenever the public exigencies require, that the property of any individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a reasonable compensation therefor."
119 Quoted in GOUGE, supra note 3, at 148. But see 6 W. HoLDswORTH, supra note 48, at 186 n.2 (2d ed. 1937). no wrong, though it may do several things that look pretty odd . . . but it cannot make one that lives under a Government Judge and party. An Act of Parliament may not make adultery lawful, that is, it cannot make it lawful for A. to lie with the wife of B .....
.120
Although Holt is torn between conflicting concepts, between respect for an Act of Parliament and the conviction that it cannot make wrong lawful,' he begins and ends with the restatement of the Bonham doctrine, paying lip service to the dawning theory of legislative supremacy.'
Pre-Revolutionary America seized on that portion of Holt which seemed consonant with what had gone before and which responded to its own needs.
Finally there is the fact that the Bonham principle had been repeated in the Viner, Bacon and Comyns Abridgments. 
1702).
1 2 1 Plucknett, supra note 5, at 55.
greater evil than a departure from that fundamental rule, that a party interested cannot be a Judge." 137 Neither court touched upon the power of the judiciary to set aside Acts of Parliament; and the fact that an exception was grafted upon a particular rule which had furnished the occasion for articulation of the Bonham "against reason" nowise diminished the doctrine. Of course, I would not intimate that one can assign a definitive meaning to words uttered by Coke 360 years ago. The glosses put by present-day scholars upon his words seem to me, however, over-subtle and debatable, and therefore I elect at the risk of being simplisticthe eighth deadly sin-to construe "against reason" as did his immediate predecessor, Doctor and Student, that is, as prohibited by the law of nature. It did not require acceptance of such later concepts as separation of powers and the like to declare judicially what was generally accepted: a "positive" law that violated the law of nature was "no law." Although the words were uttered in deciding a private dispute and presumably carried no implication of challenge to Parliament, they readily lent themselves in later days to direct defiance of Parliamentary arbitrariness. When the Colonists concluded that Parliament was intolerably abusing its power, they not unjustifiably took Coke's words, which meanwhile had been repeated respectfully by judges and in the Abridgments for 150 years, at face value. That they went on to fashion from Coke's phrase "constitutional theory" that did not enter into his thinking does not deprive it of the meaning that it bears on its face: an Act of Parliament "against common right and reason" is void. And if it is indeed void, what is more logical than that a court may say so?
